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Abstract 
This paper models strategic behavior within firms. The principal (e.g., the firm's 
owner) is handicapped by not knowing as much about the firm's capabilities as the 
agent(s) (e.g., the manager). The agent can extract some rents from his private 
information. The principal can retrieve some of these rents at the expense of 
introducing a distortion, paying the agent less than the full value of his marginal 
product. As a result the firm operates inefficiently. The degree of this inefficiency 
varies with demand elasticity and with the length of the firm's managerial hierarchy. 
The costs of operating the hierarchy create a limit to the size of the firm. 
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Prt.>ton McAfee 
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I. Introduction 
A spate of recent articles in the business press suggest that small is becoming 
beautiful. With titles like "ls Your Company Too Big?", "The Age of Hierarchy Is Over", 
"Forget Hierarchy", and "The Battle of the Bulge", they report that large firms are 
reducing the number of layers of management; becoming smaller by focusing on a 
narrower range of activities and contracting out the rest; and mimicking small firnis by 
creating decentralized subunits with responsibility for their own decision-making and 
profits.1 
What are the limitations to the size of firms? Why can a firm not achieve at 
least constant returns to scale simply by replicating the basic production process? Why, 
to quote Williamson (1985, p.131), "can't a large firm do everything that a collection of 
small firms can do and more?" It seems clear that the answer lies in the difficulties of 
controlling a large organization. It is less clear how to make this answer precise. 
Organizational costs are multifaceted; in this paper we look at one source of 
organizational diseconomies. We model a firm as a hierarchical structure, focusing on 
the possibilities for strategic behavior that arise as a result of the information about the 
firm's capabilities being dispersed within the firm. The simplest version of our model 
has a principal designing the incentives within which an agent works. Principal and 
agent can be interpreted as owner and manager; or top management and divisional 
management; or supervisor and worker. The agent has some information about the 
firm's productivity that the principal does not have: detailed knowledge of how the 
firm's production processes work, obtained from taking part in the day-to-day 
production activities (in the phrase of Hayek ( 1945), "knowledge of the particular 
circumstances of time and place"). This knowledge gives the agent bargaining power: 
he can extract some rents from his private information. The principal can retrieve some 
of these rents at the expense of introducing a distortion, paying the agent less than the 
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full value of his marginal product. As a result the firm operates inefficiently, with the 
degree of inefficiency determined by model's parameters. 
We next model a multi-tier hierarchy. We suppose that the workers at the 
bottom of the hierarchy have private information. As a result of the individuals' 
exploitation of their informational advantages, operating the hierarchy gives rise to 
information costs, which increase surprisingly quickly as the hierarchy lengthens: in one 
example, the informational losses double whenever an extra layer is added to the 
hierarchy. 
Though simple and standard, our model is rich in predictions: 
With production efficiency measured as the ratio of lowest possible cost to cost 
actually incurred, a firm's efficiency falls as its hierarchy lengthens. 
-- When the firm's market power falls (i.e., the elasticity of demand for its output rises) 
production efficiency rises or falls depending on the form of the cost function. 
-- A firm may respond to adversity by becoming more efficient. 
-- The longer the hierarchy, the smaller the marginal rate of payment with respect to 
output of the workers at the bottom of the hierarchy. (Thus small firms will tend to pay 
their workers piece rates, and large firms will pay fixed wages.) 
-- The higher an individual is up a hierarchy, the more sensitive are his marginal 
payments to performance. (Thus bonuses will be a bigger fraction of income for 
executives than for production-line workers.) 
-- The more competitive the firm's output market, the more sensitive pay is to 
performance. (So competitive firms will tend to pay their workers piece rates, and 
monopolists will pay close to fixed wages.) 
-- A firm with a long hierarchy may not be viable in a competitive industry. (So a 
large firm exposed to competition by the opening of international trade or the 
introduction of antitrust laws might respond by reducing the number of levels in its 
hierarchy.) 
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We conduct the Williamsonian experiment of merging all of the firms in an 
industry to become the divisions of a monopoly directed by an overall principal; and we 
compare the performance of the separate firms with the performance of the divisions of 
the monopoly. We rind that the comparison involves a three-way trade-off. There is 
the standard gain from monopolization: total profits rise because the monopoly can 
squeeze extra profits from its customers. And there are two contradictory technical-
efficiency effects. First, because the monopolized firm has an extra layer of hierarchy, 
the divisions are optimally given weaker incentives to exert effort than they had as 
independent firms. They therefore produce further from full-information efficiency. 
Second, because of the variation in production costs among the firms/divisions, in the 
equilibrium with competing firms the high-cost firms produce relatively too much and 
the low-cost firms relatively too little. With monopolization, the owner of the firm can 
correct this inefficiency, but the information costs mean that he cannot fully correct it. 
We find that the extra information costs within the merged firm mean it is not being 
profitable to monopolize the industry if final demand is elastic enough. Thus the model 
gives a demand-side determinant of the extent of an industry's concentration. 
As noted, we focus on one particular source of limits to hierarchy: private 
information. Our model therefore explores one particular aspect of the costs of 
centralization that Milgrom (1988} and Milgrom and Roberts (1 988, 1989} term 
Minfluence costs". Jn our model, influence costs arise because the person in authority, 
knowing less than his subordinates, is tempted to make inefficient decisions to limit his 
subordinates' bargaining advantages. Limits to hierarchy alternative to those modeled 
here include the limited information-processing capacities of managers (Geanakoplos and 
Milgrom, 1985, Guesnerie and Oddou, 1988; Williamson, 1967), and the cost of 
monitoring subordinates and the resulting inadequate effort levels (Calvo and Wellisz, 
1978, Mirrlees, 1976, Rosen, 1982).2 
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2. Hierarchies with Incomplete ln£ormatlon 
Consider first a simple hierarchy consisting of a single agent and a single 
principal. Both are risk neutral. The agent has a type (e.g., inherent productivity), 
denoted t. The principal perceives the agent's type as being drawn from a distribution 
F(t), with density f{i) and support [O, I). After accepting his contract, an agent chooses 
an output to produce, q. Let cOr q, t) be the cost to an agent of obtaining a given 
output q when his type is t. We assume that higher types have a lower cost and a lower 
marginal cost: cO/q. t)s..D, cOq/q. t)s..0 (where subscripts denote partial derivatives). 
We assume also that the marginal cost of output is positive and nondecreasing: cD q( q, 
t)>O, cOqq(q, t)"?:_D. The total revenue from selling the output is R(q), with R' '(q)s_O. 
Laffont and Ti role ( 1986) show that the agent extracts rents from his private 
information, so the cost borne by the principal is higher than the actual production cost. 
As a result, the principal orders an output from the agent that is less than the efficient 
level. For the sake of completeness we give a quick derivation of this here (although the 
reader may skip to equation (4)). 
The principal designs the way the agent is remunerated, offering to pay an 
amount that depends not only on the output the agent produces but also on the type the 
agent reports himself to be (which we denote by r). The agent's expected profit is 
(I) 1f(l) =max, £[payment I r/ - Ec0(q{r), l)j.
The Revelation Principle (Myerson, 1982) says that, without loss of generality, we can
restrict attention to payment functions that induce the agent to report his private 
information correctly. Imposing the requirementt that truth-telling is optimal for the 
agent on (I)  and using the Envelope Theorem with derivatives evaluated at truth-telling 
(i.e., r=t), we get: 
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-ECJ,i q(t), I). 
Using (2), integration by parts, and the individual-rationality constraint (1f{t)2:_0), we can 
express the agent's expected profit as 
(3) J; •(1)/{l)dl J; h(1Jc01(q(I), l)/(1)d1, 
where h(t) - [J-F(l)}/f(t). Thus the agent earns an informational rent from his 
private information about his productivity. 
The cost borne by the principal in implementing the output q( t) is the actual 
production cost incurred by the agent plus the agent's informational rent. This cost is, 
in expectation over t, C1(q(t). t) = c;O(q(t), l}+1r{t); or, from (3), 
(4) c1(q(1J. 1) CJ(q(I), 1) - h(IJCJ,iq(I), I). 
Of course, the output function the principal imposes depends not only on its cost to the 
principal (4), but also on the principal's benefits from the output, R( q). 
An output function q(t) is implementable if and only if a21r/8t8r, evaluated at
r=t, is nonnegative for all t; that is, for a slightly higher type, profit is increasing in
report. From (I), this condition is equivalent to Ec!1i[q(r), t) being nondecreasing in r 
at r=J, for all t. In turn, given CJ qt�·-°· this is equivalent to dq(t)/dt;?..0. Thus an 
output function is implementable if and only if it asks higher types for more output 
(McAfee and McMillan, 1987; Rogerson, 1897). 
The output the principal wants maximizes R(q(t))-C1(q(t}, t), where R is the
total-revenue function. Thus the optimal output satisfies R'(q(t))-C1q(q(t), t) = 0. 
Totally differentiating this expression with respect to t, we get dq( t) / dt = c1 qt! [ R' ' -
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c1 qqf. Thus, with the assumed concavity of R, a sufficient condition for 
implementability is c1 qt5'..0 and c1 qq2:..0; that is, the principal's cost function c1 inherits 
the curvature properties of the actual cost function cO. (Unfortunately, since c1 
depends on cD,. the signs of c1 qt and c1 qq depend on third derivatives of c0.) 
The second term on the right of equation (4) is the agent's informational rent 
(which, since cO, is negative, adds to the production cost c0). This shows how much 
the agent must be offered to induce him not to act as though his type is lower than it 
really is. The principal, because he bears this informational rent, directs the agent to 
produce less output than the efficient level. In other words, equation (4) says that the 
principal's asymmetric-information decision problem corresponds to a full-information 
problem with higher costs (higher by the amount of the information cost). 
The informational rent shown by (4) is larger the larger [ 1-F{t)}//(t) is; that is, 
(roughly} the bigger the variation in types across agents. The larger this is, the more 
bargaining power the agent gets from his private information. The informational rent is 
also larger the larger CJ 1 is; that is, the larger is the effect of type on production cost.
To understand the role of <!11, notice that the cost function c!1( q, t) is a reduced form;
the corresponding structural form would expliciuly involve the agent's effort. Consider 
one such structural form. Denote the agent's effort by y, and suppose his cost of effort 
is i/J(y). Define a function Y(q, t) to be the 1ninimal effort needed by an agent of type t 
to produce the expected output q. Then C(q, t) = 4>(Y(q, t)), so C1 = ¢'Y1. Here¢' is 
the marginal cost of effort, and Y1 is the rate at which the effort necessary to produce q 
falls as the agent's type rises. Thus -C1 measures the reduced cost to the agent of 
producing an output appropriate to a lower type; -C1 is the marginal benefit to the 
agent of imitating a slightly lower type. Thus the larger -C1 is, the more rents the agent 
to induce earns from his information. 
Evidence on how big these rents can be comes from a study of three divisions of 
large U.S. corporations by Schiff and Lewin (1970}. Division managers built slack into 
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their annual divisional budgets by understating revenues and overstating costs --
inflating personnel requirements, proposing unneeded projects, and failing to report the 
adoption of cost-lowering process improvements. This slack amounted to an estimated 
20% to 25% of the division's budgeted operating expenses. 3 In terms of our model, if
we interpret the division as the agent and the top management as the principal, this 
implies that the agent's rent, -h{tJc!l/ q, t), is one-fifth to one-quarter of the principal's 
cost, c1. 
Equation (4) embodies the main idea in this paper; the rest of the paper examines 
the implications of this equation for the costs of running an organization. 
3. The Efficiency of Production 
Do monopolists produce above minimum cost, causing a welfare loss beyond the 
thoroughly explored allocative inefficiencies? Conversely, does competition force 
minimum-cost production? Generations of economists have believed that competition 
provides discipline. The separation between a firm's ownership and its control tends to 
free the manager to pursue his own aims; but competition from other firms counteracts 
this by inducing the manager to make relatively efficient production decisions. 
A remarkably diverse group of economists agree that monopolies permit 
inefficiencies. Adam Smith said that monopoly is "a great enemy to good management, 
which can never be universally established but in consequence of that free and universal 
competition which forces everybody to have recourse to it for the sake of self-defence" 
(Smith, 1776, p.165). Hicks (1935, p.8) puts it more pithily: "The best of all monopoly 
profits is a quiet life." Galbraith (1979, Ch.JO), Holmstrom and Tirole (1987, Section 
4.3), Leibenstein (1966) Machlup (1967), Samuelson (1976, pp.508-12), and Scherer 
(1980, pp.38-41, 464-66) also argue that competitive firms produce more efficiently than 
monopolies. 
Some scattered evidence on this effect exists, summarized by Scherer (1980, 
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pp.46i4-66). For example, the breaking up of one U.S. cartel initiated cost-reduction 
efforts by the member firms that resulted in a decline in manufacturing costs of about 
one-quarter. As a result of the increased competition that followed the strengthening of 
Britain's antitrust laws in the 1950s, costs in some industries fell. And in a sample of 
regulated firms, the presence of product-market competition has been found to be 
associated with significantly lower unit costs. 
Despite the familiarity and plausibility of the idea that competition promotes 
efficiency in production, it still lacks a convincing theoretical basis.4 As Holmstrom and 
Tirole ( 1987) note in their survey of the theory of the firm, "Apparently, the simple idea 
that product market competition reduces slack is not as easy to formalize as one might 
think". 
This "simple idea" has been challenged, suggesting that it is perhaps not so 
simple. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that owners of monopolies have as strong an 
incentive as owners of competitive firms to prevent any self-seeking behavior by their 
managers. Thus monopolies should be no less efficient than competitive firms. 
Equation (4) above shows, contrary to Jensen allld Meckling, that when the manager has 
private information about the firm's capabilities it is not in the owner's interest to 
induce efficient production; and. as we shall see, the degree of inefficiency that is 
optimal from the owner's point of view varies depending on whether the firm is 
monopolistic or competitive. 
A natural measure of the efficiency with which a firm produces a given output 
is the ratio of the lowest possible cost of producing that output to the actual cost. (This 
is the technical-efficiency measure proposed by Farrell, 1957.) From last section's 
analysis efficiency, so measured, equals c!J / f cO -h{ t)c'11J, or J / [ l+r }, where r is the 
ratio of information cost to production cost (i.e .• r = -h(t)c!l/q. tJ/c!l(q, l)). Thus the 
extent of inefficiency depends on the size of the information cost relative to production 
cost. As information costs decline relative to production costs, measured efficiency 
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increases towards one. 
The firm's external environment affects efficiency. The principal decides the 
quantity he wants the agent to produce by equating marginal revenue to the marginal 
cost the principal pays. c1 q· Assume the principal faces increasing marginal costs, so 
that cl qq > 0. (C1 qq equals CJ qq-( [ J-F(t) J / /( t) Jc'ltqq, so this requires that 
CJ
tqq is,
if positive, not too large.) Consider the experiment of a small rotation of the demand 
curve about a pre-existing optimal point. This increases the demand elasticity and 
increases marginal revenue at that point. This means (given the assumed concavity of 
the total-revenue function) that the principal wants more produced than before. What is 
the effect of the increased production on efficiency? Efficiency, measured as 1 / [ l+r j, 
rises or falls with increases in output as r, the ratio of information cost to production 
cost, falls or rises. Thus efficiency rises with increases with output if and only if 
qc;Oq;
cO, the elasticity of cost with respect to output, exceeds qc;O,q;
cO,, the elasticity 
of the rate of change of cost with respect to type. For ex.ample, with �he cost function 
<f>3tz+l-t}q1, these elasticities are equal and efficiency is independent of output. With 
CJ-zq+( J-t)q2, c01 is more elastic than cD, and efficiency declines as output increases. 
This ambiguity in responses is surprising. As noted, it is commonly asserted that 
competitive firms produce more efficiently than monopolies. But we have just seen 
that, depending on the cost-elasticity condition, efficiency may either rise or fall as as 
the demand facing the firm becomes more elastic, that is, more "competitive". The 
standard conclusion can be regained in our model if we assume that there are many 
potential owner-managed firms that could enter the industry and compete with our 
hierarchical firm. If the elasticity of CJ exceeds the elasticity of CJ1, then the
hierarchical firm might be able to produce efficiently enough to survive the competition 
from owner-managed firms. But if the elasticity of CJ is less than the elasticity of CJ1,
the hierarchical firm will be forced to leave the industry, and the industry will consist 
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only of small firms. Hence the cost-elasticity condition determines the size distribution 
of firms in a free-entry industry. 
If we define profit as in elementary textbooks to be revenue minus production 
cost, then in the model developed here firms do not maximize profit; rather, they 
maximize revenue minus cost inflated by the information-cost term. Samuelson ( 1976, 
p.508), in assessing the assumption of profit maximization, echoes Hicks on the 
monopolist's quiet life: "As soon as the firm becomes of any considerable size and 
begins to enjoy some control over price, it can often afford to relax a little in its 
maximizing activities." According to Samuelson,, firms with less elastic demand operate 
less efficiently. We have seen that this is true in our model if the cost elasticity 
condition holds; that is, if c'11 is less sensitive to output variations than is cost itself. 
But efficiency falls with changes in demand elasticity not because the firm relaxes in its 
maximizing activities; rather, it is because the information constraints facing the firm's 
principal change with the firm's environment. 
For a similar comparative-statics exercise, suppose there is some parameter z that 
enters the cost function, with cO z>O. Then an increase in z increases efficiency if and 
only if the elasticity of cost CJ with respect to z exceeds the elasticity of c'11 with 
respect to z. In particular, if the parameter z does not alter the rate at which changes in 
type affect cost, so CJ1z=O, then an increase in z increases efficiency. Newspaper 
reports often claim that firms respond to adversity by trying harder. For example, it is 
asserted that Japanese firms responded to the recent rise in the value of the yen by 
becoming more efficient. In terms of standard microeconomics, this claim is puzzling, 
for it implies they must not have been optimizing before the yen change. But it is 
explicable by our model. Denote the exchange rate by z. The rise in the yen increased 
the price of some inputs, so CJ z>O. But plausibly it did not affect the magnitude of the 
private information within a firm, CJt• so cDtz=O. Hence the model predicts an increase 
in the efficiency of production following this external shock. 
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What contract does the principal offer the agent? The principal wants an output 
q1{1) that maximizes his profit, R{q)-C1(q, t). This output can be evoked by offering 
the agent a payment that is a linear function of output, with a marginal remuneration 
rate of cD tfq1(t}. t), provided dc0 tfq1(t), l)/dt2:_0 (McAfee and McMillan, 1987). This 
can be interpreted as a piece rate, commission rate, or managerial incentive scheme. 
That the desired output is less than the efficient level implies that this marginal payment 
rate is less than 100%. This payment scheme varies with the firm's demand. Consider 
again the experiment of rotating the demand curve about the existing optimum. As 
demand becomes more elastic, the desired quantity q1(t) rises. Because the agent's 
marginal costs are increasing, this means that his marginal payment rate increases. Thus 
the more competitive the firm's output market, the more stringent are the contractual 
incentives offered to the agent. 5 
4. Monopoly l'S. Competition 
Our model gives one answer to Williamson's question about the limitations to the 
size of firms. Holmstrom and Tirole (1989) paraphrase Williamson's question as: "why 
one couldn't repeatedly merge two firms into one and by selective intervention 
accomplish more in the integrated case than in the decentralized case. In other words, 
let the two firms continue as before and interfere (from the top) only when it is 
obviously profitable. The fact that there are limits to firm size must imply that selective 
intervention is not always feasible." 
Suppose that, in the Holmstrllm-Tirole merged firm, selective intervention from 
the top requires that an overall principal be added to control the merged firm. Suppose 
also that it is feasible for the overall principal to intervene selectively and create 
efficiency gains. Then what were the two independent firms, and are now divisions of 
the merged firm, can perform better than before. But, by our argument above, their 
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costs of operation, as perceived by the new overall principal, incorporate a new 
informational rent associated with the extra level of hierarchy. The total rents earned 
within the two divisions/firms may be higher than before the merger; but the overall 
principal may not be able to appropriate enough of these rents to cover the information 
costs he must pay. Although there are potential efficiency gains front the merger, it 
may not pay anyone to organize it. 
To compare market coordination with coordination within a firm, let us examine 
more carefully an experiment of the sort proposed by Williamson and Holmstrllm and 
Tirole. Imagine an industry consisting of 11 separate, identical firms. Each of these 
firnts consists of a single entrepreneur/worker. (This can be interpreted as a reduced­
fonn representation of a hierarchical structure.) Each firm has private information 
about its own type, which determines its costs of production; and it perceives its rivals' 
types as being independent draws from a distribution F. The firms meet each other in 
the product market in asymmetric-information Cournot quantity competition. 
We shall compare this market with the situation after the n. firms have been 
merged and now form the n divisions of a monopolistic firm. Suppose that the problems 
of bargaining with private information among the n. firms (Mailath and Postlewaite, 
1988) mean that the n independent firms could not simply form a partnership. Instead, 
the merged firm must be controlled by a single overall principal, adding a level of 
hierarchy. A three-way trade-off determines how the merged firm performs in 
comparison with the independent firms. 
Two effects work to produce gains from selective intervention. One is the 
standard monopoly effect: by choosing the total quantity to be supplied, the monopolist 
is able to extract more rents from the buyers of the industry's output than are the 
independent firms. 
The second effect can be labeled the rationalization gain from monopolization. It 
is well known that Cournot competition creates a technical inefficiency when the firms' 
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costs differ: firms with relatively high cost produce too much output, and firms with 
low costs produce too little. This inefficiency of competition can be ameliorated in the 
merged firm: the principal of the merged firm can direct the low-cost divisions to 
produce relatively more and the high-cost divisions relatively less. But the inefficiencies 
of hierarchy mean that rationalization gains can only partially be achieved. Assume that 
the marginal production costs of the firms/divisions increase with output. Full technical 
efficiency requires that outputs be allocated so that marginal production costs be equated 
across the divisions. But recall from Section 2 that the costs that the principal bears are 
not just production costs. Rather, the principal in effect bears production cost plus 
information cost, so that what he equates across the divisions are these marginal 
augmented costs. Except in the measure-zero case in which marginal information costs 
are the same for all divisions, the principal does not induce an efficient allocation of 
production to the divisions. (Consider the special case in which Fis uniform on [O, I] 
and the cost function is cfl(q, t) = (z+l-t)c(q) for z>I. The marginal cost perceived 
by the principal (from (4)) is ( z+2( 1-t) Jc' ( q), and equating this across different 
divisions with different t's does not in general equate marginal production costs, (z+l­
t)c'(q), so there is an inefficiency caused by the adverse selection. Only in the knife­
edge case of z=O are marginal production costs equalized among the divisions of the 
monopoly.) 
Working in the opposite direction to these two effects is the information-cost 
effect derived in Section 2, which tends to make the monopoly produce less efficiently 
than the independent industry. The independent firms fully bear the costs and benefits 
of their effort choices; but in the merged firm, the divisions retain only a fraction of 
the marginal returns from their actions. This inefficiency of hierarchy tends to make 
the competing firms more profitable than the monopoly.6 
To examine more carefully the Williamson experiment, comparing a monopolized 
industry with a competitive industry, consider the following example. There are n 
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producing units, which we shall alternately view as independent firms and divisions of a 
monopoly. The monopoly is controlled by a single principal; the monopolized industry 
has one more layer of hierarchy than the competitive industry. The cost function is 
zq+( 1-l)q2, where t is distributed uniformly on [O, I]. The demand curve is linear: 
price is a-bQ, where Q=Ei=l
11q;. Let ,,.c represent expected industry profits (averaged 
over types) when the firms compete as independent entities; ,,. m total profit (to principal 
and agents) when the industry is monopolized; and ,,.l the profit earned by the principal 
when the industry is monopolized. (If ,,.m exceeds ,,,C, then it is feasible for the 
principal to organize a takeover or the n independent firms, paying them their stock­
market value 1fc, and still earning positive profit.) Algebraic details are given in the 
appendix, but the conclusion is that whether or not monopoly does better than 
competition depends on the parameters. In particular: (I) for n large, ,,.m?:.,,,l>1fc; (2) for 
b large, 7rm.�_:rr1 >'Kc; (3) for b small, 'Kc>,,.m�7rl. 
The first of these is easily explained. When there are many firms competing, the 
standard profit increase from mOnopolization outweighs the organizational costs. Results 
(2) and (3), showing the effect of the demand curve's slope on the organization of the 
industry, are more novel. With very elastic demand, two of our three effects disappear: 
there is no Cournot inefficiency, and there are no profit gains from 1nonopolizing the 
industry. All that remains are the hierarchical losses due to the asymmetric information. 
Thus, when industry demand is very elastic, the industry will not be monopolized. This 
is novel, because it gives a demand-side rationale for industry concentration, 
con1plementary to the conventional supply-side argument based on economies of scale. 
The industry will tend to be competitive if there exist close substitutes for its output 
(for example, from imports); conversely, industries without close substitutes will tend to 
be monopoli�ed. 
Rents, therefore, are the lubricants that make it possible for a hierarchy to 
function. This suggests a reversal in the conventional causality of perfectly competitive 
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industries. We usually think of an industry as being competitive because the firms in it 
are small. But if larger firms mean longer hierarchies, then rents must be present for a 
large firm to be viable. Thus firms are small because the industry is competitive. 
5. Multl-level Hierarchies 
Imagine an organization with a pyramidal structure: a single principal oversees a 
certain number of subprincipals, each of whom supervise some sub-subprincipals, and so 
on down to the agents at the bottom of the hierarchy. The agents do the actual 
production, each delivering his output to his immediate supervisor, who in turn delivers 
it to his immediate supervisor, and so on until the output reaches the overall principal.7 
We do not model why the hierarchical structure is necessary, and why the overall 
principal does not himself directly supervise the agents' productive activities. Instead, 
we appeal to the plausible but ad hoc notion that supervision takes time and the 
principal's time is limited. Thus, once an organization reaches a large enough size, 
employing many agents, it is not feasible for the overall principal to supervise the agents 
directly, and he must insert subprincipals between himself and the agents. 
Assume that each supervisor designs and administers contracts for the people 
immediately below him in the hierarchy, who impose the contracts immediately below 
them. As will be seen, for the hierarchy to be nontrivial in our model, it must not be 
possible for the overall principal to impose the contracts that apply all the way down the 
hierarchy: if this were possible, the intermediate principals would be inessential, and it 
would be as if the overall principal controlled the agents directly. Once again, we 
appeal to exogenous limits to what it is feasible for the overall principal: he does not 
have time to administer lower-tier contracts.8 
We suppose that the agents at the bottom of the hierarchy who produce the 
output have private information about their types; the different agents draw their types 
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independently from F. Thus an agent's immedia1e supervisor in designing the contract 
races the asymmetric-information problems analyzed in Section 2 above. There is no 
private information further up the hierarchy: anything an intermediate supervisor does 
to transform the output is observable by his immediate principal, so from a modeling 
point of view it is as if the intermediate supervisors simply pass the output up the chain. 
(This can be regarded as a polar case: if there were additional private information 
within the hierarchy, the costs of operating the hierarchy that we shall identify would be 
exacerbated. See Melamud, Mookherjee, and Reichelstein (1989).) 
The information cost identified in Section 2 is magnified if the hierarchy has 
more than one level. Consider a hierarchy with n agents at the bottom, with types l=(I 1, 
.... tn). and k levels of principals above them. The top principal cannot prevent the 
lower-tier principals from contracting with their subordinates and learning the 
subordinates' types before they contract with him. The timing of events therefore is, 
first, the lowest-tier principals contract with their agents; then the second-lowest 
principals contract with the lowest principals; and so on up the hierarchy. 
Ultimately, the top principal will want agent i to produce an output Q; as a 
function of the types. These types will not be revealed to him, however, until after he 
announces the functions Q;. At the time the lower-tier contracts are being written, this 
output function has not been se-t. Each lower-tier principal therefore writes a complete 
contingent contract; payment is made. contingent not only on the vector of reported types 
t' =(l 1 . .. ., l11) and the realized output Q;. but also on the functions Q; that a middle­
tier principal will be asked by the top principal to implement. We shall establish, by 
induction, the multi-level generalization of equation (4). Consider the decision of a 
(.i+l )th-tier principal, for l<j+l<k (i.e., any principal other than the top principal). 
The expected payment by a ( j+l )th-tier principal to a jth-tier principal will be shown 
to satisfy (with I{ j) indexing the agents below this principal and £1 denoting the 
expectation over the vector of agents' types): 
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(5) . I Ei<l(j) El rc1+ !Q/I). I;)] 
Ei<l(j) E1 {Cj(Q;(I). I;) - h(l;)Cj,(Q/I). I;}].
This is established by an argument that mimics that given in Section 2, but with 
added notational complexity. For any feasible output profile desired by the top 
principal, Q;. the }th-tier subprincipal controlling agent i is offered a payment 
Pj/Q;· Q;. {)for i's output. For any Q; that may arise in equilibrium, the function pi; 
can be assumed to induce incentive compatibility without loss of generality (Myerson, 
1982). For any given Q;. the jth-tier principal earns a profit -xi;O;J from the output of 
agent i below him, with 
(6) 1fj;{t;) • Max E_; {P.i/q;. Q;. t_;, {;) - ci(q;, t;}J,
Q;· Ir;
where t_;"" (t 1 • .... 'i-J• t;+J· .... t11). Using the Envelope Theorem, evaluating 
derivatives at truth-telling (i.e., {i = 11), we get (denoting by E_; expectations taken 
over,_,): 
(7) lb.j· = ' dti 
a'fri. -· a11 
- E_i {Cj,(Q;(tJ. I;)].
(Notice we now equate actual output qi to the top principal's desired output Q;(t},
because (7) is evaluated at equilibrium.) Thus the sum of the expected payments by the 
( j+I )th-tier principal to this }th-tier principal is 
(8) Ei<l(j) Pj;(Q/I). Q1. 1) = 
Ei<l(j) E1 [Cj(Q,{1).1;) +,Ji(/;)]
Ei<l(j} £1 {c
i(Q(t).1;) - h(t;Jci,IQ/1).1;)].
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(The second step uses (7), integration by parts, and individual rationality, that is, 
1fj;(O)�O.) Hence we have derived the induction formula (5). The ( j+I )th-tier 
principal must offer an informational rent of h(t;)Cj/Q;(t), t;) to the }th-tier principal 
because of the private information that subprincipal has obtained from each agent i 
below him.9 
The lowest-tier principal has no private information of his own; but he inherits 
his agent's private information. Thus the hierarchy magnifies the informational rents. 
How quickly do informational rents increase as we move up the hierarchy? By 
examining equation (5), we see that the }th-tier information cost depends on the jth 
derivatives with respect to l of cOr q, t) and { /-F( t)) / /( t), so little can be said in 
general. In a tractable special case, however, the information costs rise surprisingly 
quickly. Let F be the uniform distribution on (0, I) and c0(q, t) take the form (z+I-
t)c(q), with z;:_o, (thus making the higher derivatives zero). For this example, 
substitution in (5) shows that the cost effectively borne by the .ith-tier principal is 
[z+zir 1-t)]c(q). Thus each layer added to the hierarchy doubles the information cost 
borne by the overall principal. This is because each extra layer adds an information cost 
equal to the previous layer's information cost. With this functional form, z 
parameterizes the relative importance of production costs and information costs. z is the 
cost factor common to all types of agents; the closer z is to zero, the more idiosyncratic 
are the agents' production costs, and the more important are the information costs. In 
the limiting case of z=O, the cost effectively borne by the jth-tier principal is zl times 
the actual production cost. 
6. Contractual Incentives within the Hierarchy 
Consider the simple hierarchy discussed above, consisting of a single principal 
and a single agent. As we saw in Section 2, a sufficient condition for the first-order 
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conditions to characterize the solution is c1 q(5: ...0 and c
1 
qq;::O. Now add an extra layer 
of hierarchy, so there is a principal, a subprincipal, and an agent.10 Let q2(l) be the 
top (second-tier) principal's desired output function, taking into account the cumulative 
information costs that the top principal bears. 
Does adding an extra layer to the hierarchy result in an extra output distortion? 
Given the concavity of the total-revenue function, it does if the top principal's marginal 
cost is higher in the two-tier hierarchy than in the one-tier hierarchy. The marginal 
cost borne by the top principal in the two-tier hierarchy is C2 q - c
1 
q - h(t)C
1 
qt• and so 
c2 q ;:: c
1 
q if and only if c
1 
qt�o. which we have already seen is part of the sufficient 
condition for the two-tier hierarchy to be implementable. Hence output falls as the 
hierarchy lengthens. 
By induction, a k-tier hierarchy is workable if and only if dqk(t)/dt;::O; and a 
sufficient condition for this is ciqq(q(t), t);::O and c
i
q/q(t), t)�O for all j, O:!{.j�k. and 
for all l. Since ci qq and c
i 
qt depend on ( j+2)th derivatives of cO, this is a strong and 
uninterpretable requirement. 
With an optimal linear contract, the marginal payment rate for a jth-tier 
principal in a k-tier hierarchy is ciq(q
k(t), t) , where qk(t) denotes the output ordered 
by the top (kth) principal. But this marginal payment rate is equal to ci-1 qrq
k(t), t) -
h(t)Cj-l q/q
k(t), t), Given, as before, that cj-l qts:_O, this means that the marginal rate 
of payment rises as we move up the hierarchy: a supervisor's performance bonus always 
exceeds his supervisee's. If a supervisor controls m agents, then the bonus the supervisor 
receives from his superior is more than m times the bonus given to any of the agents. 
A reduction in the desired output reduces the marginal rate of payment to an 
agent (that is, CJ q<q
k(t), t)). Thus the longer the hierarchy, the smaller the agent's 
marginal payment rate, given the agent's type. Small firms will tend to pay workers 
piece rates; large firms' workers' payments will look more like wages. In larger firms, 
workers will tend to receive more of their utility in the form of nonpecuniary benefits 
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like leisure. Because of the unobservability of the agents• actions, efficient production 
requires that the agents be paid at a marginal rate of one. The longer the hierarchy 
above an agent, the larger the effort distortion. Large firms produce less efficiently 
than small firms. 
The measure of efficiency of an agent in a k-tier hierarchy is the ratio of 
lowest-possible cost to actual cost, or CO(q. l)/Ck(q, t ) .  As the hierarchy lengthens, 
ck( q, t) rises and efficiency declines. Thus we see that the degree of efficiency varies 
not only with external factors but also with the firm's internal organization. 
To illustrate these points, let the agents• production cost be ( ( z+l-t) q2 }/ 2, and 
consider the effects of the hierarchy on one particular agent with type t. The effective 
cost borne by a jth-tier principal for this agent's output is cir q, t), or (from (5)) 
(fz+2j( l-t)]q2J/ 2. The top, or kth-level, principal, has a monopoly on the sale of the
output. and demand is linear, with price equal to a-bq. The principal maximizes q( a­
bq)-{ f z+2k( 1-l) Jq2} / 2. Thus the output the principal wants is a/ f 2b+z+2k( 1-t}]. 
Hence the agent's output falls as the length of the hierarchy above him, k, rises. The 
principal evokes this output with a contract offering a marginal payment rate of 
ci q( q
k( t). t), or a[ z+lj{ 1-t)] / f 2b+z+lk( 1-t) j. Compare these with the full-
information output, which is a/{2b+z+(l-t)], and the full-information marginal 
payment rate, which is one. Except in the extreme case in which the agent has 
maximum productivity (I=/), (a) any player's marginal rate of payment is strictly less 
than one, so the induced effort is less than at the full-information optimum; (b) for a 
player at a given level in a hierarchy, the marginal rate of payment falls as the total 
length of the hierarchy increases; and (c) within a given hierarchy, the marginal rate of 
payment rises as we move up the hierarchy. (It can be shown that dCj q(q
k{t), l)/dt is 
positive with these functional form� provided b is small enough relative to a, specifically 
lb<az. Hence linear contracts do indeed work at each level of the hierarchy.) 
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7, Concluslon 
We have proposed strategic behavior in heriarchies as a source of organizational 
diseconomies of scale. When information about the firm's capabilities is dispersed 
among the individuals in the firm, production is inefficient even though all the firm's 
members behave rationally. 
As a description of a firm, this model has some obvious shortcomings, the 
correction of which is left for future research. First, for the foregoing analysis to apply, 
the uncertainties the different workers face must be uncorrelated. If, more realistically, 
correlations exist then the principal can use relative performance evaluations to mitigate 
his i'nformational disadvantages. Second, all but the bottom members of the hierarchy 
are modeled as being relatively passive; they simply control the people immediately 
below them. A more satisfactory model would have people in the middle of the 
hierarchy explicitly modeled as being engaged in production, allowing comparisons of 
the transactions costs of internal and external vertical exchanges. Third, although we 
have interpreted the hierarchy as being within a firm, it could also be interpreted as a 
hierarchy of separate subcontractors linked by incentive contracts, on the Japanese 
model. For our model to distinguish between these two organizational modes, the 
possibility of contractual incompleteness might have to be added. Fourth, we have 
examined only the costs of operating a hierarchy. In order to explain why the hierarchy 
exists, the model would have to be expanded to include some notion of a bounded 
managerial span of control. 
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Footnotes 
• We 1hank Bengt Holmstrllm, Hideshi ltoh, Eric Rasmussen, Michael Rothschild, 
and seminar participants at Berkeley, Columbia, UCLA, UCSD, Yale, and the 
Decentralization Conference at Caltech for useful comments. 
I. In, respectively, Business Week, March 27 1989, pp. 84-94; New York Times 
September 24 1989, p. F3; World Trade Summer 1989, pp. 34-68; and Far Eastern 
Economic Review August 17 1989, p. 80. 
2. Melamud, Mookherjee, and Reichelstein (1989) also model asymmetric 
information as a source of ' hierarchy costs; a comparison with their model will be made 
below. 
3. How is the agent's understating of costs consistent with the argument leading to 
equation (4), in which agents are envisaged as telling the truth? We have seen that, to 
induce truth-telling, the principal must offer the agent some rents. An equivalent but 
more realistic process has the principal accepting the agent's reports at face value, 
knowing they involve some exaggeration, and again letting the agent keep some rents. 
4. Hart ( 1983) develops a model in which firms with separate owners and managers 
compete with owner-managed firms. Under the assumption that managers are very risk 
averse, Hart shows that managerial slack is lowered by the existence of competition_. 
Scharfstein ( 1988), however, shows that with less extreme risk aversion competition may 
increase managerial slack. 
5. Spulber ( 1989) develops a related model of the internal organization of a 
perfectly competitive firm, and looks at the interactions between agent effort decisions 
and purchased-inpul quantities. 
6. This cost of merger could be avoided if the principal could commit in advance of 
the merger not to extract rents by introducing the inefficiency; the implicit assumption 
therefore is that such a commitment is not feasible. 
7. Our model assumes away the possibility that lower-level players might collude 
against the top principal; for models of collusion in hierarchies, see Hoh ( 1 989), Laffont 
( 1988), and Tirole ( 1986). 
8. Demski and Sappington ( 1987) model a three-level hierarchy with adverse 
selection and moral hazard. Unlike in our model, the top principal designs all of the 
contracts. The intermediate principal is able to gather improved information about the 
agenl's produclivity. Thus there is an elltra level of moral hazard: the top principal 
must mo1ivate the intermediate principal to acquire the information. He does this by 
introducing exlra distortions in the agent's payment schedule. 
9. Consider a different sequence of events. Suppose the top principal can prevent 
the lower principals from offering their contracts until after he has contracted with 
them, so the top principal contracts first, then the (k-1 )th-tier principals, and so on 
down to the lowest principals. Then at the time they accept their contracts the 
intermediate principals have no private information and earn no informational rents. 
Only the agents earn informational rents, and ii is as if the hierarchy has only one stage. 
Melamud, Mookherjee, and Reichelstein ( 1989) model a three-level hierarchy in which 
the middle agent as well as the bottom agent have private information. Contracts are 
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written from the top down; unlike in the present model, however, this does not collapse 
to effectively one level of hierarchy, because of the private information in the middle of 
the hierarchy. 
I 0. We could make the hierarchy less trivial, as in the previous section, by having 
more than one person at each of the two lower tiers. But because of the assumed 
independence of agents' types, this would add only notational complication. 
Appendix: Derivations (not to be published} 
The price is p (Q )=a -bQ , cost=zq +{1 -t )q 2. 
Let a. ;;;; a -z z, a chosen so that price never goes negative. P=b-1. 
Competition
TI1c i'" finn's profits arc 
Jt, =E, q; (a -bQ }-zq; -( 1-t )q;2 
=lo.-b (n -I )µlq, -{b ;{l-1, ))q/. 
where �t=Eqt(t, ). Thus 
where, 
Thus, 
I o.-b(n-1)µ
q,· (t; 
)=2 -b+t-=-t. __ _ 
, I I µ=Eq, (r,)=-·(o.-b (n - l )µ)E-2 b + l -t 
I =-i (o.-b (n - 1  )µ)log( l+p), 
I 
I 
E --1 - = J _d_t__ = - log(b+ l -1 )  I = log(b+ l)-log(b) = log( l+b-1) = log(l+p) b+l-t 0 h + l-1 0 
µ12+b(n - l )log( l+PJI = o.log(l+p), or. 
µ = - <oi_o_g( I +jlL__ . 2+b(n - l)log( l +p) · 
I (a.--/J(n-1)µ)2 I 2 1 E <, = E- --··-·-·- = ·- (o.-b(n-1)µ) E-4 b+1-t; 4 b +l-t 
2 
_ _  I _ _21'___ _ -�'Jc,g\l+_(lJ_ __ _ 
[ 
l 2 - 4 log( l+J3) - (2+b(n -l )log( l -1-J3))2
Industry Profits under competition arc 
r{ = nE 1t = n a2p21og( I +p) 12P;{n - l )log( I +PJ2J 
lim 1t" = 0. 
lim X-: = 0. 
p_.o 
lim 1t" = oo. 
P�-
Jim 1t'" P�- log(l+p) 
n o.' 
4 
lim drrf = � 
p->0 d P  (n+I)' . 
Thus, for small p, 
1t" _ n a.1 
(n+I)' p. 
Monopoly 
n a2log( I +p) 
I (2;{n-l)J!log(l+Pll2 
y • i:(l-l;)-1 .  Note y � n • Ey = 00. ; .. 1 
The principal's profits are: 
tt1 = (a-b L.Q; )l:q1-r. 2(1-11 )q;2. 
a.1 
0 = - = o.-2bQ-4(1-1,)q, . dq; 
• - o.-2bQ . q, - 4(1-t, ) 
4Q = (o.-2bQ )L( l-1,f1 = (a-2bQ)y. 
Q 14+2by I =  o.y . or. Q = __<ll_ 4+2by . 
o.-VQ = a(4+2E,i>)-bo.y = o.-4•hL. 4+2by 4+2by 
Thus, 
a-2bQ = a(4±�11::-lh al = ___4<x__ 
4+2hy 4+2by 
q� - --"--- and 
' - ( l-1; )(4+2by) ' ' 
,1 = (a-bQ )Q-�(1-1, )q,' 
3 
- a _.±:!?.>'_ -5!L - 2:E --"-[ l 2 - 4+2by 4+2by (1-1; )(4+2by )' 
= __st_, [ (4+by }-2y l (4+2by ) 
- a' _1_ - o.' _k_
4 2+by - 4 2p+y 
As n �""". y -t00 (since y ::::n )  
a2 1 a2 1t1 = - - -t - as n -t 00• 
4 b+2/y 4b 
tt1 = a2 _Ill'._ -t 0 as � -t 0. 
4 2P+y 
I. d 1 1. 0.2 y (2p+y )-2py un -·--Jt = 1m -l\-)0 dj3 jl-40 4 (2f3+y )2 
1 1us, ror small 13 '  
a2 . y1 a1 = - hm --- = -4 �->() (2p+y )' 4 
tt1 > 1tc IFF __ n_ < _!_, which is true for n � 2.
(n+1)2 4 
TOT AL MONOPOLY PROFITS 
If, in order to buy the competitive firms, the metaprincipa1 must only pay the difference 
between what agents expect under competition and what they expect under the metaprincipal , the 
total profits of the monopoly arc the relevant comparison to r( (i.e. is there anything left over for the 
4 
mctaprincipaJ?). These profit<; are 
><" = ( a-bQ )Q - I".( 1-t; )q,' 
= 0. 4+by ---"l'__ - i: (1-t·) ,___<£. 
4+2by 4+2by ' (l-t;)'(4+2by )2 
o.' 
- [ y(4+by)-y l 
o.2(3+by)y a.2 3y+by2 
(4+2by )' 4 4+4by+b'y2 
- a.2 3y-l+b - 4 4y-2+4by-l+b2 
As noted earlier, 
n o.2 = lim rrf 4 P� log(l+P) 
lim --rt' __ 
P-><> log(l+b-1) 
Jim E rt"' = E lim 1t'" = _l_a2Ey '= oo 
b-40 b-tO 16 
Although y is  an improper random variable (no mean), y-1 is not. Since y�n, y-1e [0,1/n ].
Moreover Ey-1>0, since there is a positive probability that y Sln.
�><" 
Jim Eli" = E lim �- = E  Um ___j!!..__ _ 
b-tO log(1+b-1) b-+O log(l+b-1) b_,o :b log(l+b-1) 
= 
a' Elim �l+b / _I_ 4 •�o (2y-1+b)' b(b+I) 
= a.2 Elim (4y-1+b)b(b+I) 0 4 b-40 (2y-1+b)3 
Thus li1n E x"' = 0, and thus, for small b: 
b-40 r( 
E1t1 5. Eir" < rf  
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